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INTRODUCTION 
As set forth in opening brief submitted by Brian C. Kerr, (the “Appellant” or “Kerr”), 
there are two issues on appeal.  The first issue is whether Idaho Code § 36-1304(b), read in 
concert with Idaho Code § 36-202(i), is unconstitutionally vague and unenforceable as to Kerr.  
The second issue on appeal is whether the magistrate court misapplied Idaho Code § 36-1304(b).  
In response to Kerr’s assertions, the State makes two primary arguments.  First, the State argues 
that because Kerr admitted to the trespass, the magistrate court properly applied the applicable 
statute.  See Brief of Respondent, p. 8-11.  Second, the State attempts to avoid the vagueness 
argument by claiming that the issue was not raised or ruled on below and that any error was not 
“fundamental.”  As explained more fully below, these responsive arguments lack merit.  The 
question of vagueness was raised below as evidence by the magistrate court’s ruling.  And, even 
if it was not raised before the magistrate court, the error was fundamental and was properly 
raised before the district court and can be raised by this Court.  Moreover, the State’s attempt to 
simply point to the trespass ignoring other facts including facts that constituted the physical 
taking of the Elk highlights the primary issue on the appeal.  That issue is that the plain and 
ordinary language of the statute makes interpreting and applying the statute impossible given the 
particular circumstance of this case. The State’s theoretical and ivory tower approach to the 
magistrate court’s clear struggle with the application of the statute at issue exemplifies its 
incomplete approach to the issue on appeal.  The plain language of the statute cannot and should 
not be ignored.  The language of the Idaho Code § 36-202(i) and § 36-1304(b) must be applied to 
the facts of this case--all of the facts.  Here, that application did not occur and, consequently, 
Kerr asserts reversible error.  
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RESPONSIVE ARGUMENT 
I. The Question Of Vagueness Was Raised Below As Evidenced By The Magistrate Court’s 
Memorandum Decision 
The State incorrectly claims that Kerr did not raise the question of vagueness before the 
magistrate court.  Indeed, the State’s position is that “a review of the record shows that Kerr did 
not present an argument to the magistrate that the statute was void for vagueness or otherwise 
unconstitutional on its fact or as applied to him.”  Respondent’s Brief, p.12.  The State makes 
this argument notwithstanding the language of the May 31, 2016 Memorandum Decision that 
implicitly acknowledges that Kerr raised the issue that the “Legislature did not specifically detail 
the application of I.C. § 36-1304.”  (R., p.21).  Whether the Idaho Legislature erred by not 
providing specific detail for the application of Idaho Code § 36-1304(b) is a void for vagueness 
argument.  The argument is not complicated--the Idaho Legislature did not put sufficient “detail” 
in the statute and, accordingly, the statute is impermissible vague.  Thus, the issue was raised 
below, and the State’s argument is without basis.   
The State attempts to explain away this argument by claiming that the word “detail” has 
no meaning: “simply because the magistrate used the word ‘detail’ in dispatching Kerr’s 
statutory application argument, does not mean that Kerr argued the statute was void for 
vagueness…”  Respondent Brief, p. 14.  Significantly, the State makes no attempt to explain 
what the magistrate court meant when it acknowledged that Kerr’s “other” argument was that the 
Legislature impermissibly did not specifically “detail” the application of the Idaho Code § 36-
1304(b).  Indeed, Black’s Law Dictionary defines “vague” as “imprecise; not sharply outlined; 
indistinct.”  See Blacks Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999).  Stated differently, and in the language of 
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the magistrate court, quoting Kerr’s argument before it---the statute lacks “detail” and is, 
therefore, vague. 
As explained in Kerr’s opening brief, the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the lack of 
detail found in the present statute.  Idaho criminal statutes must be worded with sufficient clarity 
and definiteness that ordinary people understand what conduct is prohibited, and the statute must 
be worded in a manner that does not allow arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.  See Village 
of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 497–99 (1982); State v. 
Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 711, 69 P.3d 126, 131 (2003); State v. Martin, 148 Idaho 31, 34, 
218 P.3d 10, 13 (Ct. App. 2009).  “Thus, a statute may be void for vagueness if it fails to give 
adequate notice to people of ordinary intelligence concerning the conduct it proscribes or if it 
fails to establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement or others who must enforce the 
statute.”  Burton v. State, Dep't of Transp., 149 Idaho 746, 748, 240 P.3d 933, 935 (Ct. App. 
2010) (emphasis added).  Again, simply put, if the statute lacks sufficient detail.   
Here, as set forth in Kerr’s opening brief, the problem with the statute is that it requires a 
person of ordinary intelligence to believe that a person can violate the law for doing something 
that is completely illogical and nonsensical, indeed physically impossible--to conclude that he or 
she can “take” something already “taken.”  The State’s only response to this argument is that 
“physical impossibility” has no “bearing on statutory interpretation.”  Respondent Brief, p.10.  
This argument sells Idaho’s Legislative short of their important responsibility and utterly fails to 
appreciate the purpose of a criminal statute--to inform the Idaho citizenry of criminality.  A 
criminal statute that is physically impossible, illogical and nonsensical does not serve its 
important purpose but rather hinders that purpose. 
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It is undisputed fact that per the language of the statute Kerr had already lawfully “taken” 
the animal.  Thus, it is not reasonable for him to believe that he could be penalized for what 
would have to be a second “taking”--a “retaking” of something already taken.  As explained by 
the Idaho Court of Appeals in Burton, here, persons in Kerr’s situation are “[p]ersons of ordinary 
intelligence [who] can only guess at the statute’s directive in this circumstance.”  See Burton, 
149 Idaho 746 at 749, 240 P.3d at 936.  Accordingly, the statute is vague and ambiguous and 
fails to provide requisite notice and is, therefore, unconstitutional. 
II.  Even The Vagueness Issue Was Not Raised Below, This Court Should Address The Issue 
As Fundamental Error  
 
Kerr asserts that, even if he did not preserve his challenge to the constitutionality of the 
statute as applied to him as reflected in the Memorandum Decision, this Court should review it 
based on fundamental error.  Per Idaho law, appellate courts consider a claim of error to which 
no objection was made below if the issue presented rises to the level of fundamental error.  See 
e.g., State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571, 165 P.3d 273, 285 (2007); State v. Haggard, 94 Idaho 
249, 251, 486 P.2d 260, 262 (1971).  Recently, the Idaho Supreme Court abandoned the 
definitions it had previously utilized to describe what may constitute fundamental error.  State v. 
Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 961 (2010).  This Court held that an appellate court should 
reverse an unobjected-to error when the defendant persuades the court that the alleged error:  (1) 
violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights; (2) is clear or obvious 
without the need for reference to any additional information not contained in the appellate 
record; and (3) affected the outcome of the trial proceedings.  Id. at 221, 245 P.3d at 978.  Here, 
even if Kerr failed to raise “vagueness” below, the failure constitutes fundamental error because 
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it violated an unwaived constitutional right, the error is clear and obvious from the record with 
no need of additional information, and unquestionably affected the outcome of the proceeding. 
In response to this the fundamental error argument the State reiterates its prior arguments 
and asserts in conclusive and unsupported fashion that “Kerr has also failed to show that any 
error is clear from the record.”  Respondent’s Brief, p.20.  The State fails to appreciate the 
simple basis for Kerr’s claim—that the statute is flawed.  There is no extensive record that needs 
to be reviewed to come to this conclusion.  The record as it exists and the language of the Idaho 
Code § 36-1304 and 36-202 are sufficient to determine whether the statutory scheme is 
confusing to ordinary people such that they cannot appreciate what conduct is prohibited. Thus, 
the State’s conclusory statement that fundamental error is not clear form the record is 
unsupported. 
III. The Magistrate Court Erred In Its Application Of Idaho Code § 36-1304(b) 
Kerr’s argument here is not complicated.  Kerr asserts that the magistrate court 
misapplied the language of the statute (in large part because language of the statute is not clear) 
to the circumstances at issue.  Significantly, the State avoids citing the language of the magistrate 
court which illustrates not just the error, but the difficulty the magistrate court had in applying a 
flawed statute.  A review of the magistrate court’s ruling illustrates the real difficulty that the 
lower court had in applying the language of Idaho Code §§ 36-1404(b) and 36-202(i) to Kerr’s 
circumstances and why a ruling in Kerr’s favor is in the interest of justice and benefits all 
Idahoans.   
As explained in the opening brief, the magistrate judge erred by concluding that the 
initial act of shooting the elk was not, by itself, a separate act of taking, that but rather “was in 
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the very act of trespassing that Kerr was able to accomplish the [first] taking – that is, except for 
his trespass, Kerr never possessed the elk.”  Again, this application is problematic and erroneous 
because it is clearly inconsistent with the plain language of Sections 36-1404(b) and 36-202(i) 
and ignores Title 36 taken as a whole.  Idaho Code § 36-202(i) defines “take” as “hunt, pursue, 
catch, capture, shoot, fish, seine, trap, kill or possess or any attempt to do so.”  These broad 
definitions mean that Kerr’s act of shooting and killing the elk was, unquestionably an act of 
taking.  This cannot be ignored--although that is precisely what the State asks this Court to do. 
The State’s position is that it does not matter.  The State argues that “the statute places no 
explicit or implicit limits of the times one may take an animal” and that “physical impossibility” 
does not matter.  Kerr respectfully disagrees.  The plain language of the statute makes what 
constitutes a “taking” a dispositive fact and a seminal issue.  However, it is not a fact that can be 
selectively and arbitrarily applied. 
As explained multiple times in the briefing, Idaho Code § 36-202(i) defines “take” as 
“hunt, pursue, catch, capture, shoot, fish, seine, trap, kill or possess or any attempt to do so” has 
to be applied to all of Kerr’s acts.  And, thus, Kerr’s act of shooting and killing the elk before 
any trespass was, unquestionably, an act of “taking.”  Again, the State simply ignores the 
meaning of the word “take” as it applies to Kerr’s prior acts and attempts to selectively apply 
what it means to take only when it is helpful to its argument--only to the trespass.   Here, the 
statute provides as follows:  
B.  Unlawfully Taken Wildlife--Seizure, Confiscation, Disposition. 
(i) The director or any other officer empowered to enforce the fish 
and game laws may at any time seize and take into his custody any 
wildlife or any portion thereof which may have been taken 
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unlawfully, or which may be unlawfully in the possession of any 
person.  If it appears from the evidence before the magistrate 
hearing the case that said wildlife was unlawfully taken, the 
magistrate shall: 
 
(1) Order the same confiscated or sold by the director 
and the proceeds deposited in the fish and game 
account…. 
See Idaho Code § 36-1304(b) (emphasis added).  Here, it is incontrovertible that the elk was a 
lawfully taken before any unlawful activity.    
Simply stated, the “Fish and Game” statutes taken as a whole, do not support the isolated 
reading and application decided upon by the magistrate court and asserted in the State’s 
Respondent’s Brief.  Application of the statute has to apply to all of Kerr’s acts--otherwise, the 
application is truly arbitrary and capricious. 
Moreover, a review of the statutory language of Title 36 indicates that the legislature did 
not intend for the unlawful taking penalties to be read into the “trespass to retrieve” statute.  
Throughout Title 36, the legislature treated “unlawful taking” and “unlawful possession” much 
differently than “trespass to retrieve” and, accordingly, outlined specific penalties associated 
with those crimes.  For example, the unlawful taking violation has detailed penalties associated 
with it, like possible felony conviction (Idaho Code § 36-1401(c)(3)), confiscation (Idaho Code 
§ 36-1304(b)), and civil monetary penalties (Idaho Code § 36-1404(a)).  The trespass to retrieve 
statute does not have these additional penalties and is outlined as a simple misdemeanor.   
Thus, this additional evidence that if Idaho’s legislature intended for trespass violations 
to have the same penalties as unlawful taking (i.e., confiscation and mandatory civil penalty), it 
would have said so.  However, the Legislature did outline specific penalties for other types of 
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trespassing violations.  See Idaho Code § 36-1402(e) (imposing mandatory hunting and fishing 
license revocation for “[t]respassing in violation of warning signs or failing to depart real 
property of another after notification”). Accordingly, as explained in Kerr’s opening brief, by 
expressly excluding trespass to retrieve violations from enhanced penalties associated with 
unlawful taking or possession and failing to detail the application of the confiscation statute to 
“trespass to retrieve” violations, the Idaho Legislature apparently intended or at least created the 
possibility to exclude “trespass to retrieve” as an “unlawful taking” or “unlawful possession” for 
the purpose of confiscation.  See State v. Schoger, 148 Idaho 622, 629, 226 P.3d 1269, 1276 
(2010) (stating the inclusion of one thing is the exclusion of another under the statutory 
construction principle of inclusio unio est alterius).  And, in this case, this is significant because 
the State, as part of the plea deal, removed the taint of “illegal possession” when it struck the 
charge and removed all fines and penalties associated with “illegal possession.”  The State 
ignores this significant part of the procedural history. 
In sum, the statutes at issue taken as a whole and as applied to the facts of Kerr’s case do 
not support the isolated reading and application decided upon by the magistrate court and 
advocated by the State.  Accordingly, Kerr asserts the magistrate court committed reversible 
error. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above and as more fully set forth in his Appellant’s Brief, Kerr 
respectfully requests this Court reverse the magistrate court’s order denying the State’s request 
for an order of confiscation. 
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DATED this 23rd day of August, 2017.   
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